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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE IN
PASSING ON THE NOMINATIONS TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE SUREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES.*
The recent rejection' by the United States Senate of the
Presidential nomination of John Johnson Parker of North Carolina as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States has focused the attention of the American public on the
question of the respective roles of the President and the Senate
in the appointment of judges to our highest bench.
The particular charges against Mir. Parker were four in
number: (1) that he lacked ability and training, (2) that as a
judge of a lower federal court he had rendered a decision that
was hostile to union labor, (3) that as a candidate for political
office in North Carolina he had made a statement on the stump
that the Negro in his present status was unfit for high political
office and (4) that the appointment was purely a political one
-a "master political stroke" to keep alive the Republican
organization in North Carolina. It shall not be our purpose to
discuss the merits of these particular charges. Rather, we shall
address our remarks to the more fundamental question as to
the policy of the United States Senate in rejecting presidential
nominations to the Supreme Court because of their social and
economic views.
By way of introduction, we shall present first the historical
explanation for the American system of federal judicial appointment. The Constitution of the United States provides2 that
"He (the President) shall nominate, and by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . the Judges
of the Supreme Court." Three considerations are responsible
for the above provision.3 First, at the time of the adoption
*This is an address delivered at the annual meeting of the
American Law Teachers' Association at the Stevens Hotel, Chicago,
Dec. 29, 1930.
The Senate rejected Mr. Parker on May 7, 1930, after a debate of
more than a week's duration. See Cong. Record, v. 72, p. 6101. Also
see Cong. Record for debates of April 28, May 2, 5, 7, 1930.
" Art. II, sec. 2, clause 2.
"

See Salmon, Lucy P. The Appointing Power of the President;

of the American Historical Association, N. Y. 1886, v. 1, No. 5,
Papers
9
p. .
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of our Constitution, in England the appointing power was in
the executive. The framers of our Constitution, from experience, feared the Executive and they were in no mood to encourage the growth of executive power, so they provided that the
legislature should share in the appointing power. Secondly,
under the Articles of Confederation the appointing power was
in Congress. Experience had shown the "impropriety of such
appointments by numerous bodies." Intrigue, partiality, and
concealment were the necessary consequences. 4 So after the
"critical period" sole legislative appointment was out of the
question. Thirdly, the appointing systems in the states prior
to the Constitution were not satisfactory. George Mason in the
Constitutional Convention inveighed against "The shameful
partiality of the legislature of Virginia to its own members." 5
Alexander Hamilton in discussing the weakness of the system
in New York where the appointing power was vested in a governor and a Council of Appointment declared that "scandalous
appointments to important offices have been made. Some cases
indeed have been so flagrant that ALL parties have agreed to
the impropriety of the thing." 6
Three general plans were presented to the Constitutional
Convention. The Virginia Plan, presented by Edmund Randolph, contained no express provisions relating to the appointing power but it did empower the President "to enjoy the
executive rights vested in Congress by the Articles of Confederation. "17 This would have given the President the appointing
power, but since the executive was elected by Congress, the legislative body would have had considerable indirect control.
The New Jersey Plan8 presented by William Patterson, provided for a plural executive with appointing power, but the
executive was to be elected by Congress and here again the legislative body would have had indirect control.
The Alexander Hamilton plan 9 provided for a President
with life tenure to be chosen by presidential electors. The
4Max
Farrand-Records of the Federal Convention, New Haven,
1910, vol. 1, p. 119.
5Elliot, J. Debates. Washington 1845, v. 5, pp. 230-232.
eFederalist-Universal Classic Library Edition, v. 2, p. 55.
Elliot's Debates. v. 5,pp. 127-128.
sIbid. v. 5, pp. 191-192.
'Ibid. v. 5,p. 206.
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President was to have the appointment of the heads of departments of finance, war and foreign affairs, and the nomination
of all other officers subject to the approval or disapproval of the
Senate. It will be noted that the Constitutional Convention in
its attempt to avoid the weaknesses of earlier systems of appointment leaned heavily on the Hamilton plan. So much for the
historical background.
The next point by way of introduction is to determine the
extent to which the Senate has utilized directly its power of
"advice and consent" in rejecting presidential nominations to
the Supreme Court of the United States. It is impossible to
determine to what extent Senators have influenced the nomination of candidates by the President. During our history,
although the Supreme Court has varied in size, the total number
of appointments to date is seventy-eight. The Senate has rejected eight nominees.' 0 They are John Rutledge, Dec. 15,
1795; Alexander Wolcott, Feb. 13, 1811; John C. Spencer, Jan.
13, 1844; George W. Woodward, Jan. 22, 1846; Ebenezer R.
Hoar, Feb. 3, 1870; William H. Hornblower, Feb. 16, 1894;
Wheeler H. Peckham, Feb. 16, 1894; and John Johnson Parker,
May 7, 1930. It should be noted that the first rejection is the
only one relating to the Chief Justiceship,"1 and that the party
involved, John Rutledge, had formerly held an Associate Justiceship.
The fight in the Senate over the Parker nomination was not
limited to the narrow question of the intellectual ability and
moral qualifications of the nominee. The clash between Senators
Fess and Borah raised a much more fundamental problem to
which we shall direct our discussion. Senator Fess, 12 the chief
defender of Parker, intimated that "Parker is an incident. The
Supreme Court is the issue." He declared that "an effort was
being made to break down the independence of the Supreme
2 It is believed that this list is complete The information has
been taken from the official Executive Journals of the Senate until
1901 and after 1901 from the Congressional Record. The early indices
were inadequate. See Warren, The Supreme Court in the United
States History, Vol. 2, Appendix pp. 757, 763. Also a Partial List of
Executive Nominations rejected by the Senate. Library of CongressLegislative Reference Service Pamphlet JK 583.
1126 votes were recorded against the Appointment of Charles
Evans Hughes as Chief Justice. Such leaders as Webster, Clay and
Calhoun were opposed to Taney's appointment as Chief Justice.
" Cong. Record April 29. 1930.
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Court by attacking nominees who do not fit in with the particular views of those who critieise." Senator Borah 13 on the other
hand, frankly admitted that "The Supreme Court judges pass
upon what we do. Therefore it is exceedingly important that
we pass upon them. . . . We declare a national policy, they
reject it. I feel that I am well justified in inquiring of men on
their way to the Supreme Court something of their views on
those questions."
The senatorial debate thus raised the problem of the role of
the Supreme Court in our constitutional system. Is the Supreme
Court often a third legislative department? Does senatorial
investigation of every possible qualification of a nominee undermine the independence of the judiciary? Is it sound public.
policy for the Senate to pass upon the social and economic views
of the nominee?
In order to discuss intelligently the problem raised by the
Parker ease, two preliminary considerations should be disposed
of. Firstly, we should not be misled by the professions of the
court that "It is not their function to hold congressional acts
invalid simply because they are passed to carry out economic
views which the court believes to be unwise or unsound. "14 That
sentiment has been expressed innumerable times by our highest
court since John Harshall inaugurated the "awful" power of
judicial review. The crux of the problem is what the court does,
not what it says it does. Secondly, let it be understood that
there is no question as to any lack of constitutional POWER
in the Senate to examine the nominee from every possible point
of view. As far as the particular nominee is concerned, the
senatorial power of "consent" is as broad as the presidential
power of nomination. The only question is one of POLICY.
We cannot go far in the field of American Constitutional law
without encountering two widely divergent schools of thought.
At the one extreme, we find a doctrinaire conceptualism that
visualizes the fundamental law as a body of definite, eternal and
immutable principles, that worships it as "a Temple of Liberty
and Justice" and that attributes to the founding fathers the
Cong. Record April 29, 1930, p. 8220; also May 6, 1930 p. 8722.
Taft, C. J., dissenting in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S.
525, 562. See majority decision in Northern Securities Co. v. Unitec
14

States, 193 U. S. 197. See Willoughby, Constitutional Law vol. 1 p. 32.
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supreme achievement of crystallizing in the "Ark of the Covenant" the political wisdom of the ages. This position assumes
that the authors of the Constitution were omniscient and that
they anticipated each and every situation that might possibly
arise. Obsessed by the dogma of the "separation of powers," the
adherents of this view over-simplify the problem of government
and make of the court a sort of judicial slot machine. To the
members of this school legislation is for the legislature, for is
not the Constitution clear and complete and is not the court's
only function to determine the law as it IS, not as it OUGHT
to be ? To them the Supreme Court is the holy of holies, an independent tribunal, above and beyond the contemporary turmoil
of party politics and the passing vagaries of temporary majorities.
At the other extreme are those that deny that it is possible
to provide for any future contingency because each and every
situation contains an element of novelty and calls for an unique
treatment. The members of this school are so completely under
the spell of the idea that we are living in a dynamic world that
they deny the possibility of formulating any principles whatsoever, for words uttered yesterday could not have the same
meaning today. To them a written Constitution containing
"parchment barriers" is a futile thing. The evolving sense of
right of the community is the only source and sanction of law.
All is flux and "with every breath of the American people, there
is born a new constitution." To them there is no distinction
between interpretation and legislation. They have seized upon
the idea that the Supreme Court is legislating generally and in
criticising that tribunal they are attempting to judge it by
standards that are applicable only to a popular, representative,
legislative body. This latter position should be viewed as a
protest against the canonization of the Constitution which has
so long dominated our legal and political thought. The protagonists of the dynamic approach however, in their eagerness to
demolish the static conception, have overstated their case. Perhaps somewhere between these two extremes will be found a
realistic way of viewing the role of the Supreme Court as the
ultimate umpire on our constitutional system.
The writer, although not an adherent of the extreme dynamic school, believes that it is sound policy for the Senate to
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pass on the social and economic views of nominees to the
Supreme Court. As we see it, there is a fundamental difference
in the very nature of the action of a court (1) in interpreting
a statutory or constitutional provision which is vague and ambiguous from that of (2) attempting to repeal or modify a concise and definite statutory or constitutional provision. The
unwary who are unable to grasp the distinction will characterize
the court in both cases as "legislating" or in both cases as "interpreting" as it suits their interests. Actually the court in
the first case is performing one of the primary and legitimate
functions of the judicial department; that of interpreting the
law. In the second case, the court is usurping power and is
assuming the role either of a legislative or a constitutive body.
As an illustration of the distinction, consider the Supreme
Court's attitude toward two great anti-trust statutes, the Clayton act and the Sherman act. In deciding in the former 15 case
that the Clayton act did not exempt labor unions from the operation of the Sherman act, the Supreme Court interpreted the
Clayton act in the only legitimate way that it could interpret
it."' In the second case1 7 the court by adopting the so-called
"Rule of Reason" read into the Sherman act the word "unreasonable" and the Big Business interests thus gained a victory.
which through their powerful congressional lobby, they had
been unable to secure for a period of twenty-one years by means
of an amendment to the Sherman Anti-Trust law. The labor
sympathizers, failing to realize the distinction between interpretation and legislation, vehemently critized both decisions. As
a matter of fact, the criticism of the latter was deserving, but
that of the former was wholly unwarranted. In the former case,
Congress, the only culprit, escaped the wrath of the labor forces.
Three great jurists have commented on the general nature
of the judicial function insofar as it relates to judicial law making. Justice Holmes has said, "I recognize that judges do and
must legislate. But they can do so only interstitially; they are
confined from molar to molecular actions."' I s Judge Cardozo
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.443.
2 See article by author in Washington University Studies 1924
"How Far is the Theory of Trust Regulation Applicable to Labor
Unions."
S tandard ON1 of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1.
Southtern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 206.
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expresses the same view. The courts "have the right to legislate
within gaps, but often there are no gaps. In countless litigations, the law is so clear that the judges have no discretion.'"" 1
Dean Pound, referring to the extremists who believe that the
courts are legislating generally, says that "they overlook as a
rule the important difference between the process of legislative law making and the process of incidental selection of legal
materials and giving them shape as legal precepts, which is
involved in not a little of judicial decision. The latter may be
called judicial law making without any reflection upon the
courts." ' 20 In another place he says, "In Jhering's apt phrase,
the process is one of jurisitic chemistry-but the chemist does
not make the chemicals which go into his test tube. "21
However, when the Supreme Court is considering the constitutionality of a statute under the "due process clause" or
under other vague and amorphous provisions of the Constitution, we are inclined to believe that all of the statements quoted
as they relate to the possibility of judicial law making, above
are too conservative. We would then agree with Professor
Frankfurter when he says, "With the great men of the Supreme
Court constitutional adjudication has always been 'statecraft.'
The great judges are those to whom the Constitution is not primarily a text for interpretation but the means of ordering the
'22
lives of a progressive people."
There are certain governmental powers that are so broad
and elastic as to defy and baffle any attempt at precise definition
or rigid classfication. This is partially due to the nature of the
powers and partially to the poverty of our language. It would
be futile to attempt to define "due process of law" or the
"police power." The method by which our courts determine
by a process of mutual inclusion and exclusion whether a certain
case falls within or without the class may be governed partly by
precedent and partly by what has been termed "constitutional
conscience" or "hunch." ' 23 Obviously in this particular field,
constiutional law is bound to be a more or less uncertain and
'

The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 128-129.
Law and Morals 1924, p. 54.
S36 H. L. R. 641.

The Public and its Government, Yale Press 1930, p. 75-76.
The Judgment Intuitive; the Function of the "Hunch" In Judicial
Decision. Joseph C. Hutcheson, 14 Cornell Law Quarterly, 274-280.
2

,2
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amorphous thing. Here is a field where "the decision will depend on a judgment or intuition more subtle than any articulate
major premise. ' 24 The great desideratum of the court in these
cases will be whether the goal of its decision is an economically
or socially valuable thing. 25
Professor Cushman, 20 in an admirable article, has traced
the various attitudes of the Supreme Court of the United States
in construing the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Here in truth is an illustration of the Chief Justice
Hughes dictum27 that "The Constitution is what the judges say
it is." The early view was one of judicial non-interference. In
the Iunn ease 28 the court declared that the due process clause
afforded no protection against unreasonable rate regulation by
the legislature but that the remedy, if any, was at the polls.
Later the court went to the other extreme and entered the socalled period of "judicial ruthlessness' '29 applying a mechanical and legalistic interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
MKore recently the courts have become social and economic experts
aided and encouraged by the Brandeis type of brief. 30 There is
also a tendency at the present time toward the Holmes doctrine
of judicial self-denial wherein the social and economic questions
are left to the legislature. 3'
As Dean Pound has pointed out, the evolution of the common law was from that of "strict law'"-a law of definite rules,
-to one of standards, of which the standard of behavior judicially attributed to the "reasonable man" is the principal one.
The modern interpretation of "due process of law" as reasonable
legislation-that is to say, what the Court judges to be reasonable-puts our constitutional law on an analogous footing.3 2
Because of rapidly changing economic and social conditons, the
policy power of the states is expanding at the expense of the due
process conception. This inevitable growth is "the life of the
21fHolmes, J. dissent in Southern Pacific v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205.

"The Theory of Judicial Decision; Or How Judges Think. Max
Radin, 11 American Bar Assn. Journal 357 (1925).
v20 Michigan Law Review 737.
"Hughes, addresses, 1908, p. 139.
"Muznn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876.)
Ivew v. Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N. Y. 271.
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S. 412.
n Green v. Frazier,253 U. S. 233; Block v. Hirsch, 65 L. Ed. 531.

0 Preface vi. Princeton University Press 1930, fourth edition.
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law.'33 -Why should we not face the situation realistically and
concede that the Senate should have the right and the duty to
pass on the social and economic views of nominees to the
Supreme Bench.
It may be said that the above conclusion is a theoretical
justification of the Senate's right to pass on the social and economic views of nominees to the Supreme Court based on the role
that that court plays as a policy-determining body. We have
time to consider only a few of the practical difficulties of this
senatorial function in operation.
Firstly, it has been said that the Senate of the United
States is the worst "rotten borough" institution in the world. 84
New York, with a population of twelve millions, has the same
representation as Nevada with less than eighty thousand. If
the Senate were based on the proportional principle, New York
would have three hundred Senators to Nevada's two. It is
obvious that the "landed interests" are over-represented in the
Senate. The backward states' doctrine of Mr. Grundy is not
novel. Gouverneur Morris, in the Constitutional Convention,
declared, "The busy haunts of men, not the remote wilderness,
is the proper school for political talent. The 'back' members
are always adverse to the best measures.''3 5 The system of representation encourages the formation of agricultural and other
blocs which negative majority rule.36 Professor Ford has
pointed out that in the field of legislation, Senate majorities
often represent population minorities on important measures
such as the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the renewal of the
Bank Charter in 1831 and the Tariff Act of 1842.37 And yet
with all of its weaknesses, it is the universal opinion of students
of government that it is far superior to the House of Representatives. If there is to be legislative participation in the appointing power, the United States Senate is the preferable existing
participant.
Secondly, if the Senate is to pass on the social and economic
3Brandeis, J. dissenting in Washington v. Dawson, 264 U. S. 219,
336.

Burgess. The Election of United States Senators, Pol. Sc. Quart.
vol. XVII p. 650 (1902).
"Farrand, Records of the Federal Convention, v. 1, p. 583.
W. S. Carpenter, Democracy and Representation, pp. 60-61, Princeton Univ. Press 1925.
"The Rise and Growth of American Politics, p. 275.
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views of nominees, does it necessarily follow that this practice
will encourage partisanship and will result in straight party
voting alignments!. Obviously if this result is to follow, the
American appointing system would break down because of deadlocks, unless the President should go outside his party for the
nominee. During the last fifty-two years, the Republican party
has held the presidency for thirty-six and the Democratic party
for sixteen years. For a confirmation of appointments requiring only a majority of the Senate, the President was of the same
political party as the Senate for forty of the fifty-two years.35
But we need not fear the possibility of a deadlock for the very
good reason that our two great parties do not represent any
fundamental difference in point of view. If this were as strict
a party government as our political orators would have us believe, it would have been impossible during the last fifty-two
years for any treaty to be made, for at no time during that
period did the President have the necessary two-thirds of the
Senate without securing votes of the other party in support
of his measure.3 9
Finally it is submitted that if the Senate exercises its right
in the future to pass upon the social and economic views of
nominees to the Supreme bench, it will not mean that that
august tribunal will be drawn inevitably into the maelstrom of
party politics. Certain considerations will have a determining
influence to prevent that dire calamity. First, it should be
noted that strictly party appointees often seem to lose their
partisanship once they have been elevated to the Supreme bench.
If there was ever a case of carefully scrutinized, hand-picked
political nominees, it was in those appointments made by the
Jeffersonian Republicans after the death of the Federalist party.
The fundamental requisite of every nominee was that he be a
strict constructionist and every appointee had that requisite.
But Charles Warren.4 has shown that "in Story's case, as in
so many other instances in the history of the court, there was
demonstrated the utter futility of the expectations frequently
entertained by politicians that the judicial decisions of a judge
would accord with his politics at the time of appointment-to the
"The American Party System, Merriam and Gosnell, Revised Edition, Macmillan, pp. 81, 82, 1930.
3,Ibid p. 81.
4*

The Supreme Court in United States History, vol. 1, p. 420.

KENTucKy LAw JouRNAL

Supreme bench." Confirming this view, President Buchanan
wrote on July 18, 1857,41 "No Whig President has ever appointed a Democratic judge, nor has a Democratic President appointed a Whig; and yet the remark has been general that the
Democrats appointed to this bench have always leaned to the
side of power and to such a construction of the Constitution as
would extend the powers of the Federal Government." '42 To
this statement there is one exception, Peter V. Daniel of the
Old Dominion, appointed during the closing hours of the Van
Buren administration. Daniel was the strict constructionist par
excellence, and for a period of nineteen years on the Supreme
bench he dissented consistently in every case involving the
doctrine of implied powers.
len may differ as to the reasons for this desertion from the
strict constructionist camp. Beveridge believes that they became turncoats because of the influence of the master mind and
personality of John Marshall. 48 Perhaps the extremely strict
constructionist view is by its very nature limited to the party
in opposition. This explanation seems plausible in view of the
embarrassment of Jefferson over the purchase of Louisiana.
Perhaps the true explanation is that with the growth of the
country and the development of means of transportation and
communication, a sort of "manifest destiny" compelled the
abandonment of the principle that was dear to Jefferson's heart.
But there are other influences that make for the futility of
purely political appointments to our highest bench. The tenure
for life and its attending independence and the importance and
dignity of the office will tend to sublimate the factious and petty
and partisan. Finally, the fact that the court by a self-imposed
limitation refuses to give advisory opinions and refuses to appear in the role of an assailant of the law by limiting its jurisdiction to a bona fide case wherein the rights of an individual
under the law are involved will further remove the court from
partisan influences. De Tocqueville, commenting on this aspect,
has said, "It will be readily understood that by connecting the
censorship of the laws with the private interests of members of
the community, and by ultimately uniting the prosecution of
Ibid footnote, p. 420, v. 1.
Ibid, vol., 2 p. 79-82.
3Beveridge, Life of Marshall, v. 4, p. 60.

41
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the law with the prosecution of an individual, legislation is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of
party spirit."
However, the impression should not be gained from the
above discussion that the Supreme Court ever has or will be
entirely free from politcal influence. Brooks Adams has pointed
out that "from the outset the American bench, because it deals
with the most fiercely contested of political issues, has been an
instrument necessary to politcal success. Consequently, political
parties have striven to control it.""4 It has been said, and I
believe truly, that the trend of Marshall's and Taney's views
in cases involving political doctrines, could not be changed by
argument of counsel in special cases. They enunciated party
tenets. And so in the rare case where Supreme Court judges
were selected to serve on the Hayes-Tilden electoral Commission,
they voted as party men. This kind of partisanship cannot be
corrected by any change in the method of selection.
In conclusion we desire to refer to what seems to be the
most unfortunate aspect of the Parker case. Frank R. Kent,4 5
writing in the Baltimore Sun before the rejection of Parker,
said "When the debate on the Parker appointment occurs this
week, there will be much oratory about his alleged conservative
or reactionary trend, about his unfairness to labor, about his
political and judicial record and about Mir. Hoover, but there
will be remarkably little about his attitude toward the negro
in politics, although that will be uppermost in the minds of
every regular Republican on the floor. That is the tender spot.
That is the thing they walk around as if it were a swamp. It
is hypocrisy at its height." This acute observer of the American political scene was right. Such regular Republicans as
Deneen of Illinois and Robinson of Indiana, voted against the
Parker nomination presumably because of their fear of the
negro vote, and ten Southern Democrats 46 voted for Parker.
Their position was a difficult one. If Parker was to be rejected
because of his view on the negro in politics, perhaps no outstanding Southern nominee of either party can be found in the
"The Theory of Social Revolutions, pp. 47-48.

"Baltimore Sun for April 28, 1930.

"Blease, Brossard, Glass, Harrison, Overman, Ransdell, Stephens,
Swanson, Simmons, Smith paired in favor.
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future whose view will differ from that of Parker. Even if it
were possible to find a capable nominee who had not expressed
himself publicly on the matter, the Senate as a real advisory
body would find means of "smoking out" the nominee. The
significance of this aspect of the case can only be realized when
it is pointed out that Justice McReynolds is the only Southerner
on the present bench and that he is entitled to and it is rumored
will retire in 1932. There was a time 47 when the slave power
dominated the Supreme Court of the United States. Has it
come to pass that the New South will be unrepresented on that
highest tribunal because of the political power of the emanci48
pated negro
FORREST REVER

BLACK.

University of Kentucky,
College of Law.
4T
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 19 Howard 393.
4'The vote on the Parker nomination was as follows: Yeas: 39.
Allen, Baird, Bingham, Blease, Broussard, Dale, Fess, Gillett, Glass,
Goldsborough, Gould, Greene, Hale, Harrison, Hastings, Hatfield,
Hebert, Jones, Kean, Keyes, McCulloch, Metcalf, Oddie, Overman, Patterson, Ransdell, Reed, Shortridge, Simmons, Smoot, Steck, Stephens,
Sullivan, Swanson, Thomas (Ida.), Townsend, Walcott, Waterman,
Watson.
Nays 41: Ashurst, Barkley, Black, Blaine, Borah, Batton, Brock,
Capper, Caraway, Connally, Copeland, Couzens, Cutting, Deneen, Dill,
Frazier, Harris, Hawes; Hayden, Howell, Johnson, Kendrick, La Follette, McKellar, Norris, Nye, Pine, Pittman, Robinson (Ark.), Robinson
(Ind.), Schall, Sheppard, Shipstead, Steiwer, Trammell, Tydings, Vandenburg, Wagner, Walsh (Mass.), Walsh (Mont.), Wheeler.
Not Voting 16. Brookhart, Fletcher, George, Glenn, Goff, Grundy,
Heflin, King, McMaster, McNary, Moses, Norbeck, Phipps, Robsion,
Smith, Thomas (Okla).

Mr. Wallace Muir, President of the Kentucky State Bar
Association, received his academi3 education at the University
of Kentucky, studied law at Washington & Lee University;
LL. B., Central University, in Kentucky. Member of the firm
of Stoll, Muir, Townsend & Park, of Lexington, Kentucky.
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Judge J. R. Keaton, Pres.
Okla. Bar Association
(Subject to be announced later) ........ Judge Charles I. Dawson
Workmen's Compensation Board Procedure ........... Clyde L. Levi
The Law School of the University of Kentucky and
its Relation to the Bar Association ......... Dean Alvin E. Evans
The Lawyer in Politics .......
........................ John L. Dorsey
What We Can Do About Prohibition, from a Legal,
Social and Economic Standpoint .... Hon. Henry W. Anderson,
Richmond, Va.
PROGRAM (TENTATIVE) -KENTUCKY

